

半夜裡的一通電話，埋葬了中菲關係

“重返亞洲要用什麼手段呢？那當然就是製造中國內部的和它跟鄰國之間的矛盾了。”

～水秉和～

到底誰在改變現狀？

七零年代，大陸的文革搞得如火如荼，國力消耗於政治鬥爭之中。相對而言，越南打敗美國，志得意滿，氣勢逼人，並立刻進一步奪取靠近海南島的西沙群島。中國在1974年的奪島戰爭中，以弱敵強，拿回了西沙群島，但是南北越合併後總加起來佔據了南沙群島的二十多個島或島礁，並從事建設，招標開發油氣田。也就在七零和八零年代，菲律賓也佔據了在巴拉旺省西邊的8個島或島礁，也在從事人工改造。

你或許會問：既然這兩國所佔據的島嶼都涉及跟中國的領土糾紛，那麼美國有沒有指責它們“改變現狀”？有沒有指責它們妨害“航行自由”？有沒有說這兩個國家具有“侵略性”呢？好像沒有耶！不但沒有，並且近幾年來美國一直是站在它們那邊說話，對中國指手畫腳。除了積極拉攏越南之外，它最近才跟菲律賓在黃岩島附近進行了一次規模很大的聯合軍演。針對中國的造島活動，它的軍機和艦隊也三番五次地到這個海域巡航示威。請問，從沒有介入到介入，是不是“改變現狀”？

在歷史上屬於中國的領土上的南沙群島中，越南和菲律賓佔據了大部分島嶼，可是中國沒有使用武力去奪回來。中國其實蠻客氣的，一直要求跟它們一對一地談判，但是一直談不成，所以找了3個無人居住的，突出水面的礁石，和5個高潮時被海水淹沒的暗礁，將它們改造成島。由於中國擁有自己製造的巨型挖沙船和其他巨型設備，所以花了大概不到兩年時間，就打造出一批比越南和菲律賓造了幾十年都造不了那麼大的人工島。然而，就是為此，美國說中國“改變現狀”，妨害“航行自由”和“具有侵略性”。

蒂亞戈·加西亞(Diego Garcia)

有些客觀的論者看不慣，就說話了：為什麼印度洋裡有那麼一個小島，叫作蒂亞戈·加西亞，本來居住了至少1500名土著居民的，現在一名都不剩，反而變成了美國掌控印度洋的重要海軍基地？是誰強迫哪些居民搬走的？哦，原來是美國把這個島和附近的小島從英國買了過來，給了英國1400萬，要英國強迫把這些人搬走。英國很聽話，把原住民抓趕上船，把他們搬到千海哩以外的塞舌爾島去了。你說，這難道不是改變現狀？這難道沒有剝奪了哪些原住民的航行自由和他們的人權？這難道不是非常具有侵略性嗎？

國際關係就是這樣的，藉口可以隨便找，不管是大規模毀滅性武器（伊拉克），滅族威脅（利比亞），還是妨礙航行自由或破壞現狀（南海），只要擁有龐大的，足以籠罩全球的宣傳機器，虛假藉口也能產生真實的效果。從二次戰後

到今天，美國基本上擁有最強的軍事力量和最龐大的宣傳機器，用以維持它所認為的現狀。它把前蘇聯掌控的社會主義陣營壓垮了，這好像不算改變現狀，也把自己的盟友日本的經濟給壓下去了，那也不算。有些論者還說，它還蓄意把歐元區給壓垮了。是否如此，姑且不論，總之，它現在大肆宣傳的，極為明顯，就是劍指中國。

怎麼重返亞洲？

在希萊莉擔任國務卿期間，她跟國務院的高級顧問，也就是赫赫有名的哈佛教授約瑟夫·奈（軟實力一詞的發明者），以及主管東亞和太平洋事務助理國務卿 Kurt Campbell，提出了一個“重返亞洲”戰略（後來認為這個名詞太具有侵略性，所以奧巴馬將之改為再平衡）。他們指出，美國擁有一個巨大的地理優勢：美國東西兩邊是海，而南北兩面只有加拿大與墨西哥--兩個對它不構成威脅的國家。中國呢？中國是全世界鄰國最多的國家，一共14個，並且跟其中好幾個存在著矛盾。

重返亞洲要用什麼手段呢？那當然就是製造中國內部的和它跟鄰國之間的矛盾了。

雖然我們絕對不敢懷疑諾貝爾和平獎的崇高地位，也相信它不會受到低級的，暗箱作業的政治操縱，只不過我們世俗人的小心眼有時難以理解過於高尚的理念。例如：為什麼它會把和平獎頒給正在阿富汗和伊拉克兩國大打熱戰的奧巴馬？也難以捉摸為什麼會在關鍵時刻頒獎給劉曉波和緬甸的安瑞素姬。回想起來，或許大家還記得安瑞素姬受到希萊莉和奧巴馬的熱烈擁抱，以及獲獎前後在英國、美國和在整個歐洲所享受到至高無上的榮耀。（安瑞素姬似乎了解和和平獎的深刻含義，所以好像無動於衷，或者說沒有被收買，在她的全國民主聯盟政黨取勝前，她到北京訪問，勝選後首先邀請的是中國外長王毅到緬甸訪問。）

中國有14個鄰國：朝鮮，俄國，蒙古，哈薩克斯坦，吉爾吉斯斯坦，塔吉克斯坦，阿富汗，巴基斯坦，印度，尼泊爾，不丹，緬甸，老撾，越南。此外，隔海相望還有：日本，菲律賓，馬來西亞，文萊，印尼。其實我們還應當考慮到東盟的其他國家，如泰國，新加坡等。簡言之，中國的邊境環境是非常複雜的，利益衝突是多方面的，合作是充滿挑戰的。如果某些境外國家要從中挑撥的話，渠道應當是很多的，後果也可能是相當嚴重的。例如黃岩島。

黃岩島：美國夢寐以求的切入口

雖然我們把黃岩島列入中沙群島之一，它其實獨自從深海中突出，高潮時水面只露出幾平方米的礁石，可是，在淺淺的水面下，它的礁盤卻非常廣大，據百度的資料，約140方公里（作為對比，中國至今造的最大的島才不到7方公里）。它距離菲律賓的呂宋島的蘇比克灣（1992年以前是美國在亞洲最大的海軍基地）只有230公里，戰略地位極其重要。在礁石圍繞的內部，它有一個很大的海灣，被稱為瀉湖，約95方公里，是避風良港，其附近也是很好的漁場。當然，對中國而言，它還具備巨大的造島潛力。

自1978年起，中菲兩國就在這裡不斷有爭執，而菲律賓經常扣押他國的漁船，包括大陸與台灣的漁船和漁民，索取罰款。2012年4月，這裡爆發了一場所謂的黃岩島事件。當時，中菲雙方都非常緊張，積極處理，但是它們都沒有預見，這是一樁改變南海門爭格局的大事，因為它給美國一個開闢切入口的機會。

菲律賓出動了攜帶武器的海防船隻，把十幾艘中方的漁船堵在瀉湖內，企圖扣押。在此緊急時刻，中國的兩艘海監船趕到現場，形成兩邊對峙。由於事態嚴重，所以中菲兩國代表開始在雙方的首都進行談判。

Peter Lee（可能是美籍菲華記者）最近在他的部落格 China Matters 上（Everything You Think You Know about Scarborough Shoal is Wrong, 所有你知道關於黃岩島的事都是錯的）和在總部設在香港的英文網報 Asia Times 上的文章（South China Sea Dispute: Rewriting the history of Scarborough Shoal, 南中國海的爭執：重寫黃岩島的歷史）中詳細敘述了這件事的來龍去脈。內容相當複雜，大家可以參考原文，我在此只能簡述。最關鍵的是，他揭發了美國如何藉此插手進來，徹底破壞了中菲關係。

問題是：兩國自己解決，還是國際化？

Lee寫道，“真實情況是，中國跟菲律賓成功地通過雙邊談判，解決了問題。正是由於它的成功，以至於菲律賓的外交部長Alberto Del Rosario 逼得去破壞它。實際上，中國佔領該島不是菲律賓將之國際化的原因，而是它的後果。”

這裡牽涉到三位關鍵人物。一位是阿基諾總統的親信特使，參議員 Antonia Trillanes IV，他是這三位中唯一親中的重量級政客；一位是仇中親美的菲律賓外交部長Rosario，也是Trillanes的政敵；還有一位就是美國駐菲大使Harry Thomas。



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推進中美相互瞭解合作 促成海峽兩岸和平統一 倡導和諧平等多元世界

2012年4月10日，中國的海監船在黃岩島制止菲方扣留中國漁民，形成對峙。阿基諾沒有找外交部長Rosario跟北京交涉，因為他知道Rosario親美並主張將中菲的領土爭執國際化，所以他找了他的親信Trillanes，請他從另一個渠道（菲律賓報紙是用backchannel一詞）暗中跟中方談判，希望以一對一的方式，和平解決對峙的局面。Trillanes跟包括傅穎在內的中方代表往返於兩國首都，一共舉行了16次談判，雙方同意按順序撤離，而不是同時撤離。這是因為許多船隻在瀉湖內，而湖口很窄，不能同時撤離。他們也同意，在雙方都撤離之後再討論如何分享該海域的資源。中方提出的一個重要條件就是不得將這個問題國際化。菲方的一個條件是，不得在該島作建設活動。

Rosario知道Trillanes在他背後進行談判之後非常憤怒，乃從中阻擾。根據Lee的報導，“Trillanes，作為阿基諾的代表，正在就按順序撤離進行談判時，不涉及談判的Rosario接到了美國駐菲大使Harry Thomas的電話（顯然是在半夜接到的），然後他就在沒有通知總統的情況下命令單方面撤離，然後指控中國違反了同時撤離的協議。”（Lee在別處說明，這個電話是Campbell授意的。）

簡言之，半夜裡美國的一通電話，埋葬了中菲關係！

當然，Rosario本來就主張用強硬手段對付北京，可是，沒有美國撐腰，他是不敢這麼做的。

此處爭執的重點是，到底中菲兩方的船隻應同時撤離，還是按照一定的順序撤離。Rosario接獲美國方面的電話說是要同時撤離，而Trillanes跟中方達成的協議是按順序撤離。但事實上菲律賓的船隻已經先撤離了，而Rosario就藉此指控中方違約，因此就把這個爭議國際化了。

這件案子的內情是在事後才披露的，也就是在Trillanes與北京達成的協議被菲律賓內閣否定後（否定的原因也甚複雜，包括Rosario在報上散佈假證據），他向《星報》（Star）記者Tiglaio透露了一份四頁的備忘錄，其部分內容如下：

“總統指示我親對方研討如何依次將停泊在瀉湖內的政府船隻撤離。但是，6月4日晨，總統告訴我，我們的漁業事務與海洋資源船（BFAR）已經離開，而中國的船隻卻違背了同時撤離的協議，沒有離開……我問他，是誰同意同時撤離的？我正在討論按順序撤離，因為瀉湖的湖口太窄，不能夠同時撤離。總統說是外交部長告訴他，說這是在華盛頓達

成的協議。”

Trillanes接下來問，“既然協議是同時撤離，那麼我們為什麼先撤？總統說，這就是我問Rosario的問題，為什麼沒有得到我的指示，他就命令BFAR先撤？”

據Trillanes說，按順序撤離的協議一直到7月時還有效，即：如果菲律賓不在柬埔寨召開的東盟區域論壇中提出這件案子，將之國際化，則中國就撤走最後三艘船。但是，菲方提出了對中國的指控，而該論壇受到中國的壓力，並沒有將之納入議程，菲方乃決定向國際仲裁法庭提出。這麼一來，中菲關係鬧翻，中國佔據黃岩島，菲律賓投向美國的懷抱。

Lee說，西方媒體歪曲這件事的順序，把責任歸咎於中國的“擴張性”和“侵略性”。如此這般，2012年，美國為其重返亞洲戰略找到了一個切入口，然後軍機航母就可以開進阿基諾提供的軍事基地。

這就是美國重返亞洲戰略的一個實例。離間中國與其鄰國之間的關係是這個戰略的重中之重。

結語

菲律賓於1986年發生了一件轟動世界的大事，那就是“人民力量”推翻了馬可斯獨裁政權。它的導火線是馬可斯派人在馬尼拉機場槍殺了阿基諾的父親。阿基諾的寡母乃被群眾推舉出來，跟馬可斯競選。馬可斯擔心他敗選，所以在選票上大做手脚。這就引起民憤，群起遊行示威，馬可斯就鎮壓。有人或許還記得修女安坐地上，擋住坦克的動人畫面。結果群眾勝利，馬可斯夫婦乘坐美國提供的軍機，逃亡到夏威夷，安享餘年。有人或許還記得，群眾闖進總統府，搜出3000雙伊美黛夫人的鞋子。

因為美國到最後一刻才放棄對獨裁者馬可斯的支持，阿基諾夫人擔任總統之後，她和她的支持者都非常反美，乃決定不再繼續租給美國兩個龐大的軍事基地：克拉克空軍基地和蘇比克海軍基地。換句話說，在圍堵中國的第一島鏈上，出現了一個巨大的缺口。

現任的阿基諾總統沒有記取他父母追求政治自主的意志，受到像Rosario這種親美政客的擺弄，無論如何是令人遺憾的事。回想2012年的談判，北京很可能沒有佔據黃岩島的計劃，只是想找出妥善的分享海洋資源的辦法。因為，黃岩島突出水面的部分太小，不花大功夫造島，根本無法掌控。但是，菲律賓既然引狼入室，北京方面幾乎不得已也要設法把黃岩島變成一個可以居住的島。

黃岩島潛在面積相當大，可以成為優良的港口，中國一旦決定造島，則對美國在南海的霸權將是很大的威脅。這就是中美兩國的博弈幾乎必然會加劇的道理。

Sino-Vietnam War (1979) Deserves Serious Reflection - A Tipping Point for the Collapse of the Soviet

Mainstream and Organic Views
Dr. Wordman

An anonymous 50-page document discussing the brief Sino-Vietnam war (SVW) in 1979 came to my mailbox recently. The document implied that it was written by a Western analyst and translated to Mandarin by the analyst's colleague. The document was suppressed from publication because the superior of the analyst felt that too much credit and praise were given to the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping. After examining this document, I found that the analyst had presented fairly accurate facts (events, dates, names, geographic locations and some statistics related to the war) which could be checked out by research. The analyses and comments in the document are quite logical, definitely making the paper deserving to see the daylight. Hence, I am summarizing this long article, Foreign Sources Revealing the Truth of Sino-Vietnam War, with my comments in this column.

This paper started with the notion that the changes with small nations could not make enough impact to the balance or struggle of world powers. China's strategic change from being a nominal member in the Soviet Union bloc to a de facto ally with the U.S. was the primary reason that had led the Soviet Union to collapse eventually. The Soviet and the U.S. leaders did not have any serious regard to China's presence in the world arena until Nixon-Kissinger (1972) realized and formulated a strategy of working with China against the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping visited the U.S. on January 1, 1979, the date the U.S. Recognized China, and seven days later China launched a massive but a short 28 days war against Vietnam.

The document went into depth describing Vietnam and her wars with France and the U.S. which had built her confidence in winning brutal wars; indeed, the Vietnam soldiers (even civilians) were credited as tough fighters, persistent, deadly and cruel. Though Vietnam essentially won the Vietnam war but she was resentful that China did not support her all the way and China was courted by the U.S. (1972-). Although receiving military aid from China, Vietnam acted alone and hostile to her neighbors, Khmer, Laos and Cambodia; She conquered the South Vietnam in 55 days (1975). Vietnam's over confidence in her ability to fight and her obvious ambition reminded China about Japan's behavior towards China and Indochina prior to WW II. The Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai was alarmed and passed on instructions to Deng to watch out for Vietnam and to prepare a strategy to check her ambitions.

The Vietnam leader, Li Yi, went to Beijing (11/1977) asking for more military aid, but Deng refused him, and then he turned to the Soviet Union. The Soviet wanted to suppress China and granted Li's full request; a year later they signed a peace and cooperation treaty. Then within one year, Vietnam armed all her military forces with Russian equipment. In 12/1978, Vietnam attacked Khmer, captured Jin Bian in 14 days and

destroyed Khmer, but it was both a strategic and a tactic mistake. China was wary of Vietnam's ambition in Indochina and had been preparing for war with Vietnam. Destroying Khmer essentially enhanced China's resolve to teach Vietnam a lesson. Hence, during Deng's visit to the U.S., he told President Carter his plan of attacking Vietnam. Carter, with the Vietnam War experience, warned Deng and did not want to get involved in any battle against the war hardened Vietnam. Deng, of course, had all figured out how to fight Vietnam, including stationing troops on China's Northern border in case Russia invading in the name of helping Vietnam.

Deng originally planned to attack in January, 1980, but khmer's fall in the end of 1978, hastened Deng's plan. Tactically, military maneuver and fighting in the Monsoon season (March and April), are not desirable. Vietnam's attack on Khmer in December and won in 14 days gave China a whole two months to act. Since China had well prepared for a number of years, this two months window was perfect for China to move up her plan. Deng, an excellent and avid bridge player, after touched base with Carter and calculated Russia's inability to mobilize during the winter, then made a decisive decision to punish the Vietnam with a quick and devastating attack by moving 300,000 Chinese troops with overwhelming fire power across the border (7/8/1979). Though the Vietnam troops were tough and loyal, but they were caught by surprise, outnumbered, outgunned, ill trained for large scale war and poorly equipped with communication gear, thus, suffered great casualty.

In sixteen days, China took Liang Shan, threatening to sweep the open flat capital, Ho Nui, but next day Deng ordered troops to withdraw to return home, on the way back destroying any resistance and industrial bases. Deng regarded Vietnam as the Soviet's Cuba in the East but he only wanted to punish her not conquer her. Tactically, Deng did not want to prolong the war into the Monsoon season. Given Vietnam's fearless or martyr style resistance, the fighting would drag into the rain season. The SVW lasted only a total of 28 days; Deng essentially achieved his objectives, seriously if not permanently quenched Vietnam's ambition of conquering Indochina and her aggression in the Sino-Vietnam border. Vietnam would need a decade or two to recover from the SVW.

This brief war was regarded as a huge success and a brilliant strategic execution produced a lasting impact to Vietnam. After the war, China became firmer in defending any Sino-Vietnam border conflict

including the dispute in the South China Sea; China threatened to teach Vietnam a second lesson. This pressure had kept Vietnam to keep one million troops along the border and cost the Soviet Union \$2-2.5 million a day to support them. The Cuba show-down with the U.S. made Khrushchev lose face but the U.S. had to promise not attacking Cuba, hence Cuba was never harmed other than being sanctioned till President Obama Visited Cuba normalizing their relationship (2016). The SVW made the Soviet Union lose more than face. It caused the Soviet Union to decline because of her heavy burden in foreign aid. The Soviet Union's inaction during the SVW cost her so much prestige that many members in the Soviet bloc begin to defect. Egypt was the first to defect. President Anwar Sadat was in talks with Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, but hesitated to sign a treaty, but three months after the SVW, Sadat became braver and signed a peace treaty with Israel on 3/26/1979. Next was Afghanistan where a coup removed the pro-Soviet leader; Russia had to send 100,000 troops to topple the coup. Then there was Iran where an Islam revolution started 6 days before the SVW to topple the pro-U.S. King. Due to the SVW and the Afghan war, the Soviet Union had no time to take advantage of the Iran revolution. Supporting Vietnam and Afghanistan was an unbearable burden and cost the East Europe a recession. Poland first rebelled (8/14/1980), although the union revolt was put down but a cleavage between Poland and the Soviet Union formed and others followed.

Post SVW, the Sino-Vietnam border conflicts continued until Liyi died (7/1986). Then Vietnam had a naval battle with China in the South China Sea in 1988 but was defeated; Vietnam officially recognized China's claim and occupation of the Parcel islands. Cambodia revived post SVW and kept fighting Vietnam, a bleeding wound for the Soviet Union. With Egypt's defection, the Soviet began to lose her advantages in the Middle-East; Afghanistan became another bleeding wound for her. Both SVW and Afghan war made the U.S. (Reagan) more confident to engage a struggle with the Soviet not only in the Middle-East but also in Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia), then Africa became the third bleeding wound for the Soviet. Tracing events back to 1979, we can conclude logically that the SVW was the tipping point for the decline of the Soviet Union. The SVW made the U.S. to see the weakness and vulnerability of the Vietnam and Soviet Union. The short SVW was the only war China initiated against a sovereign country in her modern history. In the other wars, China was either passive or being attacked. The 28 days SVW with low casualty on the Chinese side (<10,000) had two very significant consequences. One, it stopped Vietnam's ambition of conquering the entire Indochina and laid foundation for a peaceful Indochina. Two, due to Soviet Union's strategic mistake of supporting the Vietnam against China, the SVW was the tipping point for the Soviet Union to collapse. The U.S. working with China against the Soviet Union was a winning strategy.

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